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Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
2000 Term
by RICHARD G. WILKINS,* SCOTT WORTHINGTON,** CARTER K.F.
CHOW,*** SARAH K.L. CHOW,**** ADAM BECKER*****
I. Introduction
This Study, the fifteenth in a series,' tabulates and analyzes the
voting behavior of the United States Supreme Court during the 2000
Term.2 The analysis is designed to determine whether individual
Justices and the Court as a whole are voting more "conservatively,"
more "liberally," or about the same when compared with past Terms.
As in politics, whether a judicial trend is "conservative" or "liberal"
often lies in the eye of the beholder. A lawyer for the American Civil
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
** J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 1999. Associate,
Robinson, Seiler & Glazier.
*** J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2002.
**** J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2002.
****'* J.D. Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2003.
1. Professor Robert E. Riggs began this Study with Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
1986 Term, 2 BYU J. PUB. L. 15 (1988). Professor Richard G. Wilkins continued the
Study in Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1991 Term, 7 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 1 (1992)
[hereinafter 1991 Study]. The last seven Studies, analyzing the 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996,
1997, 1998, 1999 Terms, were published in the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly. See
Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1993 Term, 22 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 269 (1995) [hereinafter 1993 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme
Court Voting Behavior: 1994 Term, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1995) [hereinafter 1994
Study]; Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1995 Term, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1996) [hereinafter 1995 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins, et al.,
Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1996 Term, 25 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 35 (1997)
[hereinafter 1996 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1997
Term, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 533 (1999) [hereinafter 1997 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins,
et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1998 Term, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 423 (2000)
[hereinafter 1998 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1999
Term, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 543 (2001) [hereinafter 1999 Study].
2. The 2000 United States Supreme Court Term covers decisions made from
November 2000 to June 2001.
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Liberties Union could well paint an ideological picture of the Court
far different from one sketched by a lawyer from the Pacific Justice
Institute.
This Study attempts to remove this subjectivity by applying the
following consistent classification scheme to ten categories of cases
across time: "conservative" votes are those that favor an assertion of
governmental power, while "liberal" votes are those that favor a
claim of individual liberty.' By tracking the Term-to-Term
conservative or liberal changes in the voting patterns of individual
Justices and the Court as a whole across these categories of cases,'
and by applying standard statistical tests to the resulting data,5 this
Study attempts to provide reliable information regarding the current
ideological posture of the Court and its members, as well as
conclusions and projections regarding its past and future trends.
Whether any statistical study of a process as complex as judicial
decision-making can be reliable is, of course, open to debate.6 But,
within the limitations inherent in an attempt to "number crunch"
ideology, this annual survey offers students and practitioners
information that is useful for assessing how the Court or an individual
Justice has voted - and may vote in the future - in particular types of
cases.
This Term's survey shows mixed results, but suggests slight
liberal movement for the Court as a whole, following last Term's
conservative voting trend. The "Majority" decisions in six of the ten
categories (Civil/Federal Party, Criminal/State Party,
Criminal/Federal Party, First Amendment, Statutory Civil Rights, and
Federalism) indicate varying degrees of liberal movement. For
example, the voting results from the Criminal/State Party category,
the Study's second most reliable category for ideological
3. There is no single, settled definition of conservatism or liberalism. See generally
M.A. RIFF, DICTIONARY OF MODERN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 67-73, 141-52 (1987)
(discussing various possible interpretations of the terms). This Study's definitions,
however, are close to the core ideals of each ideology. See id. at 67 (noting that
conservatism "implies fear of sudden and violent changes, respect for established
institutions and rulers, support for elites and hierarchies, and a general mistrust of theory
as opposed to empirical deductions"); see also id. at 142 (asserting that "twentieth-
century" liberalism is "compounded of constitutionalism; doubtful of pluralism; certain[ J
of a belief in the virtues of economic freedom, and less certain[ ] of a desire to restrict
government intervention in most other aspects of life").
4. See infra Data Tables 1-10.
5. See infra Appendix B.
6. See infra note 38.
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manifestations of voting behavior,7 reveal a decline in the Court's
support of the State Government.8 Similarly, the Court showed
significantly less support of the Federal Government in the
Criminal/Federal Party category, holding in favor of the federal
government only 28.6% of the time in "Majority" decisions.9
However, the liberal movement in some categories, such as the First
Amendment category, must be viewed with caution. Because the
Court only heard four cases with First Amendment claims, the results
of the First Amendment category may not be reliable. Furthermore,
although the Court showed liberal movement in its "Majority"
decisions in Civil/Federal Party and Statutory Civil Rights cases, these
two categories ranked as the two most unreliable indicators of the
Court's ideological voting trends this Term.
Of the categories that showed conservative movement
(Civil/State Party, Equal Protection, Federal Jurisdiction and Swing-
vote), the statistics from the Swing-vote and Civil/State Party
categories are most significant. The statistics from the Swing-vote
category indicate that in close, ideologically charged cases, the Court
voted conservatively 60% of the time." The conservative movement
of the Court in Civil/State party cases is also significant because the
Civil/State Party category is the most reliable indicator of the Court's
ideology this Term." Although the Court showed conservative
movement in the Equal Protection category, the results may not be
reliable because the Court only decided four Equal Protection cases
this Term. The movement in the Federal Jurisdiction category,
although nominally "conservative," is somewhat ambiguous because,
compared with outcomes for the past nine Terms, this year's score is
still relatively "liberal."
The anticipated voting scores for the 2000 Term were not as
close to the Court's actual scores as they have been in past years.
Like last year, the Study most accurately anticipated results for the
Civil/State Party category; however, this Term, the average difference
between anticipated and actual scores in the category was 9.29
percentage points per Justice compared to last Term's average
difference of 4.95 percentage points per Justice.2 The anticipated
7. See infra Part V.
8. See infra Data Table 3.
9. See infra Data Table 4.
10. See infra Data Table 10.
11. See infra Part V.
12. See infra Data Table 1; 1999 Study supra note 1, at 554.
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scores in the Statutory Civil Rights Claims category differed most
from the Justices' actual scores, deviating by an average of 40.33
percentage points per Justice." However, the great difference
between the anticipated and actual scores could be due to the fact
that the Court only heard four cases with Statutory Civil Rights
claims this Term.
Generally, the Study's anticipated voting scores for "Majority"
decisions were much closer to the Court's actual scores than the
anticipated votes of individual Justices. In the Federalism category,
for example, the anticipated and actual scores for "Majority"
decisions differed by only 2.4 points, while the greatest difference was
in the Criminal/Federal Party category where the actual and
anticipated scores differed by 22.8 points. With regard to the
accuracy of anticipated scores for individual Justices, Justice
Kennedy's anticipated scores were closest to his actual scores,
differing by an average of only 10.32 points in each category. Because
Justice Kennedy is considered a "swing-voter," it would seem that his
voting behavior would be more difficult to anticipate. However, the
anticipated scores for Justices Souter and Breyer deviated most from
their actual scores, by 23.26 and 26.41 points respectively.
Category analysis, introduced in the 1996 Study and included in
the Study again this Term, indicates that the categories of Civil/State
Party, 4  Criminal/State Party, Criminal/Federal Party, 16  and
Federalism 7 are the best indicators of the conservative/liberal
predilections of the Justices. The remaining categories, Equal
Protection," First Amendment,' 9 Federal Jurisdiction,2 ° Civil/Federal
Party, and Statutory Civil Rights,22 are relatively poor indicators of
the Justices' voting propensities.23
Frontier analysis this Term revealed a few interesting changes.
Justice Scalia moved into the top spot on the "Conservative Frontier"
13. See infra Data Table 7.
14. See infra Data Table 1.
15. See infra Data Table 3.
16. See infra Data Table 4.
17. See infra Data Table 9.
18. See infra Data Table 6.
19. See infra Data Table 5.
20. See infra Data Table 8.
21. See infra Data Table 2.
22. See infra Data Table 7.
23. See infra Part V.
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with a super efficiency score of 101%, displacing Chief Justice
Rehnquist as the most conservative Justice this Term. Justice
Thomas also moved in front of Chief Justice Rehnquist, taking the
second spot on the "Conservative Frontier" with a score of 100%.21
On the other end of the spectrum, Justice Breyer took over the
distinction of the most liberal Justice on the Court with a frontier
analysis score of 120% .25 The top three Justices on the "Liberal
Frontier" - Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Souter - all recorded super
efficiency scores above 100%.
This Study is divided into sections to make the information more
accessible to the reader. The precise details of the statistical analysis
- as can be gleaned from a glance at the equations and explanations
in Appendix B - are hardly the topic of light cocktail conversations.
However, one need not have an advanced degree in mathematics to
understand the general trends that flow from the Study's analysis.
Part II gives a description of the mode of analysis employed by the
Study. Part III follows with a general overview of this Term's
findings. Part IV sets forth the Study's numerical tables, graphs, and
statistical charts and discusses - table-by-table and chart-by-chart -
the information contained therein. Parts V and VI describe the
methodology and outcome of this year's "Category" and "Frontier"
Analyses, respectively. Appendices A and B detail the definitions
and statistical tests employed by this Study.
H. Mode of Analysis
This Study is based on the tabulation and mathematical analysis
of each Justice's votes in ten categories. Nine of the categories are
based on the nature of the issues addressed (e.g., First Amendment,
Equal Protection, etc.) or on the character of the parties involved
(e.g., state or federal government litigants). 6 The tenth category
tabulates the number of times each Justice voted with the majority in
cases decided by a single, or swing, vote.
The first nine categories are designed to detect each Justice's
24. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 1.
25. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 2.
26. The categories are as follows: (1) civil controversies in which a state or one of its
officials or political subdivisions is opposed by a private party; (2) civil controversies in
which the federal government or one of its agencies or officials is opposed by a private
party; (3) state criminal cases; (4) federal criminal cases; (5) First Amendment issues of
freedom of speech, press, and association; (6) equal protection claims; (7) statutory civil
rights claims; (8) issues of federal court jurisdiction, party standing, justiciability, and
related matters; and (9) federalism cases.
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attitude toward two broad issues underlying most Supreme Court
decisions: the protection of individual rights and judicial restraint.
The tabulation of votes in each category reveals, in broad strokes, the
frequency with which individual Justices and the Court as a whole
vote to protect individual rights27 or to exercise judicial restraint.28
From the voting patterns that emerge, the Study determines
whether individual Justices and the Court are taking "conservative"
or "liberal" positions. The Study classifies outcomes that favor an
assertion of governmental power as conservative and outcomes that
favor a claim of individual rights as liberal. Accordingly, the Study
classifies as conservative a vote for the government against an
individual, a vote against a claim of constitutional or statutory rights,
a vote against the exercise of federal jurisdiction, or a vote favoring
state (as opposed to federal) authority on federalism questions. The
Study classifies all contrary votes as liberal.
This analytical scheme is not perfect. Unanimous decisions,
which constitute a significant portion of all cases decided by the
Court, are included in the Study's calculations even though liberal or
conservative ideology may not have influenced the outcome of such
cases. Unanimous opinions often result when either the law or the
facts, or both, point so clearly in one direction that ideology is not a
decisional factor. Furthermore, concern for individual rights is not
27. Votes implicating individual rights are tabulated in tables reporting the outcome
of state and federal criminal prosecutions (Tables 3 and 4), as well as those detailing the
resolution of claims based on the First Amendment (Table 5), the Equal Protection Clause
(Table 6), and civil rights statutes (Table 7). The civil cases examined in Data Tables 1
and 2 also involve individual rights, as these suits pit the government against persons
asserting private rights. The federalism decisions tabulated in Table 9 are less obviously
relevant to individual rights because such decisions focus on the balance of federal and
state authority. Nevertheless, in such cases, the practical effect of voting for the state is to
deny federal relief to a party alleging state encroachment upon his or her rights.
28. Jurisdictional questions (Table 8), which exhibit the relative propensity of the
Justices to avoid judicial decisions, are perhaps the most direct statistical evidence of
judicial restraint. Other Tables included in the Study, however, also provide some
indication of the individual Justices' (and the Court's) positions on the "judicial
restraint/judicial activism" axis. Judicial restraint is normally identified with deference to
the policy-making branches of government, adherence to precedent, avoidance of
constitutional bases of decision when narrower grounds exist, respect for the Framers'
intent when construing constitutional text, and avoidance of issues rendered unnecessary
by the doctrines of ripeness, mootness, political questions, etc. As a result, a vote in favor
of individual rights claims (Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) may provide some indication of
"judicial activism" because judicial recognition of individual rights often requires the
Court to overturn precedent or invalidate an existing statute. Federalism issues (Table 9)
are also relevant because judicial restraint is traditionally identified with respect for the
role of the states within the federal system.
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always, or even necessarily, the attitudinal opposite of judicial
restraint.
Despite the difficulties with our classification scheme, the basic
assumption that supports this Study - that the general orientation of
individual Justices and the Court regarding individual rights and
judicial restraint is suggestive of conservative or liberal ideology -
appears sound." For example, deference to legislatures frequently
results in rejection of an individual's claim, especially one predicated
upon the impropriety of governmental action.30 Judicial restraint is
associated with a reluctance to read new rights into the Constitution
or a statute.31 Refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction leaves the
matter to state courts with their possible bias in favor of state
governmental action and is a clear rebuff to the claimant seeking
federal protection of rights.32 Therefore, to the extent that the Study's
basic ideological assumptions regarding liberal and conservative
outcomes are accurate, it is possible to identify trends by tracking the
voting patterns reflected in Data Tables 1 through 10."
To reckon current ideological positions within the Court, votes of
the individual Justices can be compared with those cast by other
Justices this Term, as well as with the outcomes for the 1991 through
1999 Terms. Likewise, the current ideological position of the Court
as a whole can be determined by comparing present outcomes of the
Court majority with those of prior Terms. In Data Tables 1-10, this
29. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also infra Part V.
30. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (holding that the statutory distinction
in 8 U.S.C. § 1409, which imposes different requirements for a child's acquisition of U.S.
citizenship based on whether the mother or the father is the citizen parent, is consistent
with Equal Protection).
31. See id.
32. See, e.g., Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1998) (holding that
claim preclusion by reason of a prior federal judgment is a defensive plea that provides no
ground for removal from state to federal court).
33. Of course, the data is only as reliable as our assumptions. The general assumption
that a vote in favor of the government reflects conservative views may not be accurate in
all cases. For example, see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), where the
more conservative members of the Court voted liberally against the state in order to
reaffirm the importance of economic rights - generally considered to be a conservative
value. Similarly, in Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps., 531 U.S. 159 (2001), the
conservative members of the Court voted liberally against the federal government based
on the their desire to avoid deciding a constitutional question. While our classification
scheme is far from perfect, it does have the advantage of being consistent. Moreover, this
consistent scheme is applied to every case the Court decides. Therefore, on balance, the
data should provide relatively reliable indicators of the Court's conservative or liberal
leanings.
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information appears in the form of voting percentages for each
Justice and for the Court majority. Charts 1-10, in turn, graphically
depict the Court's voting trends revealed in the tables.
Mean Tables 1-10 and Regression Tables 1-10 analyze the voting
patterns of the individual Justices. The purpose of these tables is to
determine whether a Justice's 2000 Term voting record departs in a
statistically significant manner from his or her prior voting pattern
and whether any significant correlation exists among the Term-to-
Term voting patterns of the Justices.
34
In past studies, we included "predictions" of the Justices' voting
scores in the Data Tables. However, this year, we changed the title
"Predictions" to "Anticipated Voting Behavior" in order to more
accurately reflect the utility of our data; the term "Predictions" seems
to suggest that our data is robust enough to have predictive value. It
does not. However, "Anticipated Voting Behavior" - based on the
statistical analysis of past voting behavior - is useful in gauging the
relative importance of changes in voting patterns from Term to Term.
In order to calculate the anticipated voting scores of the Justices, we
use an Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA)
forecasting model.35 The ARIMA model is useful in situations where,
as in this Study, a single variable (a Justice's voting score) is forecast
based only on its present and prior values with no other explanatory
variables.
In order to determine which categories best reveal the
conservative and liberal leanings of the Court, we apply factor
analysis, which "tests" the Justices' disposition of cases in the various
categories. Factor analysis has long been used by psychologists
attempting to identify characteristics of personality or intelligence.36
The results of the factor analysis for the 2000 Term appear in Part V
of this article.
Finally, Frontier Analysis Tables 1-4 and Frontier Charts 1-4
compare the Justices' conservative and liberal predilections this Term
and over the course of the entire Study. Frontier analysis37 mitigates
some of the analytical difficulties previously discussed by measuring
the strength of each Justice's tendencies relative to the rest of the
Court with respect to the cases actually decided in a given Term
rather than against any absolute scale.
34. See infra Appendix B.
35. See id. for a more detailed explanation of ARIMA.
36. See id. for a more detailed explanation of factor analysis.
37. See id. for a more detailed explanation of frontier analysis.
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All of these data and statistics must be interpreted with caution.
The percentages and statistical results revealed in each table are
affected not only by the dispositions of the individual Justices but also
by the nature of the cases decided each Term. Furthermore, Supreme
Court cases are not the result of random selection, and the universe
of votes cast by the Justices is relatively small. Since both random
sampling and large sample size are crucial elements of any fully
reliable statistical analysis, conclusions drawn from this Study are not
beyond dispute. There are obvious limitations to any empirical
analysis of a subjective decision making process."
In light of these caveats, one might ask whether this Study is
worth conducting or reading. We believe it is. For years, experienced
Supreme Court practitioners have attempted to divine the ideological
predilections of individual Justices in framing their arguments to the
Court. Moreover, both the media and academicians are fond of
attaching ideological labels to the Court and its personnel. Supreme
Court practitioners, legal scholars, and the public have long assumed
that assessments of Court ideology are valuable - even though such
assessments may be based upon little more than the gut reactions of
the attorneys, scholars, and news reporters involved. This Study,
based upon a systematic methodology for objectively gathering,
quantifying, and analyzing data over time, should be more reliable
than such ad hoc assessments.
I. Overview of the Ideological Trends of the 2000 Term
The results of this Term's survey suggest slight liberal movement
after last Term's conservative voting trend. Six of the ten categories
showed liberal movement in "Majority" decisions. Specifically, the
Court's support of the federal government in criminal cases
plummeted to an all time low of 28.6%, and the Study's second most
reliable category for indicating conservative/liberal trends,
Criminal/State Party, showed liberal movement in all types of
38. The general reliability of statistical inference depends on random sampling. See
generally ALLEN T. CRAIG & ROBERT V. HOGG, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL
STATISTICS 157-58 (1995); RAYMOND H. MYERS, CLASSICAL AND MODERN
REGRESSION WITH APPLICATIONS 9-11 (1990). The Court's method of selecting cases is
far from random. Rather, it is the result of a conscious decisional process. Furthermore,
reliable statistics generally require large quantities of information to produce reliable
results. As sample sizes become larger, inferences become more accurate. This Study is
subject to sampling bias, both because the sample is not random and because it is
comparatively small. The statistical inferences below, therefore, may not accurately
represent a Justice's (or the Court's) views.
255
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decisions. Yet, this apparent liberal movement is somewhat counter-
balanced by the fact that the Study's most reliable category for
indicating conservative/liberal trends, Civil/State Party, demonstrated
conservative movement. Also, in Swing-vote decisions, the Court
voted conservatively 60% of the time. An overview of the results in
each individual category follows. A more in-depth analysis of each
category is set forth in Part IV of this Study.
Data Table 1: Civil Cases - State Government versus a Private Party.
This Term the Court showed a conservative trend in favor of the
state government in "Majority" and "Split" decisions. The Justices
maintained roughly the same positions in the rankings as last Term,
with the exception of Justice Breyer - who moved from the third most
conservative position last Term to the most liberal position this Term.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas tied for
the most conservative ranking, with Justice Stevens and Justice
Breyer holding the two most liberal positions. The anticipated voting
scores for the 2000 Term were generally quite accurate in this
category. Justices Ginsburg and Stevens continue to have a strong
voting correlation of 0.97 and a high R2 of 0.93. Factor analysis also
shows that, of Data Tables 1 through 9 of this Study, Data Table 1
provides the most reliable indication of conservative/liberal bias.
Data Table 2: Civil Cases - Federal Government versus a Private Party.
The Court's treatment of the Federal Government in civil cases
is difficult to plumb this Term. Over time, the Court seems to be
following a slightly liberal trend. However, it is uncertain whether
the Court voted more liberally or more conservatively this Term in
Civil/Federal Party cases because, even though the Court's
"Majority" and "Unanimous" cases showed liberal movement, its
"Split" cases (which usually are a more reliable indicator of ideology)
showed conservative movement. Furthermore, six of the nine
Justices showed a statistically significant change in their voting
behavior, with historically liberal Justice Stevens recording the most
conservative score this Term. Federal civil cases have generally been
a reliable indicator of conservative/liberal bias. This Term, however,
and perhaps partly because of the unusual voting patterns recorded
on Data Table 2, factor analysis dropped federal civil cases from the
top tier of ideological reliability.
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Data Table 3: Criminal Cases - State Government versus a Private
Party.
The data in this category reveals a significant liberal shift on the
Court this Term. Seven of the Justices voted considerably more
liberally than they did last Term, with only Justice Stevens and Justice
Souter voting slightly more conservatively than they did in 1999.
Although the voting was very close, the Court favored states in
"Split" decisions and favored private parties in "Unanimous"
decisions. In "Majority" cases, the Court decided six cases in favor of
the states and six cases in favor of private parties. Data Table 3 this
Term reflects the classic conservative/liberal ranking - with Justices
Scalia, Thomas, Rehnquist, Kennedy, and O'Connor at the
conservative "top of the chart" and Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer,
and Ginsburg at the liberal "bottom" - usually associated with the
current Court.
Data Table 4: Criminal Cases - Federal Government versus a Private
Party.
The liberal trend from the previous three Terms continued in this
category. The 2000 Term scores for "Majority" and "Split" cases
were the most liberal they have been since this Study began. For the
first time in ten years, more cases were decided against the federal
government than for the federal government. The individual
rankings of the Justices remained roughly the same as last Term.
Data Table 5: First Amendment Rights of Expression, Association, and
Religion.
The Court demonstrated liberal movement and increased
support of First Amendment claims in both "Majority" and "Split"
cases this Term. Like last Term, however, the Court did not vote
unanimously in favor of any First Amendment claims. Conclusions
regarding voting trends in this category may not be reliable because
the Court only considered four cases with First Amendment issues.
Regarding the individual Justice's voting behavior, Justice Kennedy's
voting scores were the most liberal for the third Term in a row and
the most predictable this Term. The data suggests that Justice
Kennedy may well provide the most dependable vote in favor of First
Amendment claims.
Data Table 6: Equal Protection Claims.
Although the Court decided more Equal Protection cases than it
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has in the last few Terms, the small number of cases in this category
makes it difficult to identify trends with much certainty.
Furthermore, the small number of cases makes it almost impossible to
anticipate a Justice's voting behavior with accuracy. Despite the
small number of cases, the Court exhibits clear conservative
movement this Term compared to last Term. Oddly, Justice Stevens
voted the most conservatively on Equal Protection cases this Term.
Data Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights Claims.
The data in this category shows slight liberal movement this
Term but conservative movement over time. The fact that seven of
the nine Justices showed a statistically significant change in voting
behavior also indicates volatility in this area. Five Justices voted
more liberally than anticipated, and two Justices voted more
conservatively than anticipated. Justices Stevens and Breyer showed
the highest level of voting correlation. Because the Court only
considered three cases involving statutory civil rights claims this
Term, we cannot draw definite conclusions based on the data.
Data Table 8: Federal Jurisdiction Claims.
It is likely that, after last Term's significant liberal movement and
anomalous support of Federal Jurisdiction claims, the Court is
returning to more normal voting patterns in this category. Every
Justice on the Court voted more conservatively this Term than last
Term, and the Court as a whole also showed conservative movement
in its "Majority," "Split," and "Unanimous" decisions. None of the
Justices showed a statistically significant change in voting behavior.
The five most historically liberal Justices held the five most liberal
positions on the data table, with Justice Stevens holding the most
liberal position for the third Term in a row.
Data Table 9: Federalism Cases.
Again we see the classic conservative/liberal split on the Court
with the traditionally conservative Justices at the top of the rankings.
The voting behavior this Term was mixed. The Court was slightly
more liberal than last Term in two categories, slowing the
conservative trend in "Majority" and "Split" decisions over the last
three Terms. The "Unanimous" decisions moved in the opposite
direction, with a more conservative outcome than the past three
Terms. While this pattern is somewhat ambiguous, the Court voted
against the state more often than not in all three categories of
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Federalism cases: "Majority," "Split," and "Unanimous" decisions.
On balance, therefore, Data Table 9 provides some evidence of
liberal movement.
Data Table 10: Swing Vote Cases.
The Court's voting record in cases that were decided by one vote
this Term continued the conservative trend that began last Term.
Although the 1999 Study anticipated that Justice O'Connor would
vote with the majority most often, Justice Kennedy was the most
frequent swing-voter this Term, voting with the majority in 83.33% of
the swing vote cases. Justice O'Connor, the second most noted
"swinger" on the Court, voted with the majority in 66.67% of the
Swing-vote cases.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
0 ___N___
S 000 0\ 1?N ~ 0
d0~
> 
-o ooo o ) - N
P"~ ~ ( O 0 0 \0 c m0 N C>- I'D C,
U ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 rl CD C) CN 00 m .r; k 6
C CN 0 N V en 0q Cn 00 '0
W) ~ ~ 1 UnW) InW
c! r:. .. wo
- H k n - - W - r -
-H ok c )W
g F F n 70 C -
-HM M \, - 10 M k
cc~f Ln ) mm k
0ca~N ~ 0 0 ~ ( -
U,
rVnl. 2.Q
FVol 29:
Winter 2002] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2000 TERM 261
0-
.i
o to o to oo rI- tO N'X0 N
HASTINGS CONSTITI JTIONAI L AW fl TARTP T V
-'-I
0 0 0 0 00 0
03
E) . 0 c. 0l 01 01 !) 0
COOD
>
UO
In 0) -1 )r
t- c , o
00
to 0)
0) V)
f'Ih-l )O.
1 V7J1.la
Winter 2002] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2000 TERM 263
e
= 0
4>
S. 0
cd
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
-'0 '0
> >
m 0
a) ) a~a 0 '2-~- 't ' 0 1
Q -V)
UN UOC, f 00 001co
<DC mt
W) ',) ar6 o~ V, cai m~ r,
Ina C) W0 ' )  0 U r- '0 '0 ' r-
0
C) 0) -F-
0o0 I'D C )' - ca a00rc0
-F- -" *qC4C - -r 4 M r
.- 0 c
C) a E
0 >~
u *
b-
[Vol. 29:
\lq \C cl
It en c1l
0 tn kn W)
eq 
- I
Oh
Winter 2002] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2000 TERM 265
9L
oCD
o o
a)
0"
0°
co
N L o N
I--
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
0 O N N 0 (, ,7
W)W)0)
w0 
_____= __= ___m__R__N
~u a
u +~
0>
0
0
[Vol. 29:
Winter 20021 SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2000 TERM 267
268 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 29:
IIL[1
rC-I 00'. - 40 I 0 C14 rcJ
*
~ CO
I CO ~
I~. ~
C -- q t =IR W
OU 00 r t- 00 - 00 ~
- l oo r )
on 00 00 00 00 ON CA It
~ >0
t0 Ui 0. ' 0 M Mr CrC=' CrC '.0
0c w, ) 0 00 0 m m W) tn Cl'.D
CCC \C W )W n n I
U
0
>O
U l
m' E r--C'.0 crcr rN'Om
O r 00 0'. N ) No N ' CCCC 0 0
07\ U 0 m 0 '7, .r-' 'o - kn-' tn' r- \. 0 mr
'c9 \ 0 'C \q \ C .q ',1 CrC CrC mr
0'. U CrC '.0 '.0 InC j- ( n MN ZT Crc M
m W00m 0 00C>
N - 0 0 CkCn ~ r . r
u 0CrnC N 00 < 0 0 0 fnC '0 N
O 0 N 0 Cr 00 '.0 ICC'.0 V:cC .
M 0
A~ 0 > CO,
Winter 2002] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2000 TERM 269
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
00 )fl Q~ Cl) Cl) CO 000)0)0)0)0)0)0)0)0
4.)
Er F-oo o 6 - 6cO o Q I
~~0)
0)0
00
4 000
[Vol. 29:
Winter 2002] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2000 TERM 271
6" o
02v~
u1 Q)0
b XZM'• C- _
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
oc (NH T C1 -
> N-
0> .0
(n ,I ) = W 1
cfl
00 0 N - O 0 0 e ' 0
C: t< 0 00 M0 W Un (N (N (N - ( N
CO -' '0 0 UN 0 "T V: I n - 0
O0) ON 00 N 000 '0 WN 00 en 00 W)
0 ON 0 0 (= (= ke)0 C0
en ON 0 U 0 en '0 '0 '0 '0, '0 ('N 0 UN
C\ N- -ItN -I e't N ON r'N 'T MO t W 0 N
ONh 0 '0 00 N01 00 00'U UN r N 00 ') 0 r- 0
0 ON '0 ON ON' U 4(N U N 'o
0 0 010- Vol ON 0OnoN
ON 0)UN0020'NON
o
C's c ' 0 0
0~ .0 0E
[Vol. 29:
Winter 2002] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2000 TERM
0
0 o 0
o r-U
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
-I-'
U, 0~U , U ) U ) U
4)
Ul 0
u
m W
'. wi 0OCOC. r
u
u +
cc <
U)
fVS-Sl ")V-1 lo
Winter 2002] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2000 TERM 275
0
Ob
> E
0
c tn -. -
000
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
"R0 00 - 0-
om (ON r> ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r kf) N____________
>~>
~~~~3~~e 000 '0 0a~C
N ~ ' (N 000 C. N r
0 ~  ~ ~ ~ ~ k r., t--C) 'C)NN'
cn e C-4 (N4 (N r4( - - -- h cn -
00)~~~~~~C NC)t t)C)C)(N( N
O r 0 t- cw) t) cw) '0t '0Nn
0N (n C1 N C 00 0'010R
0 0C) CD 0 D 0 D 0w) 0D 0 0 0 0D
S ON
en ____ 0 ,- 1 1
oa -" r-r-w__k o
~ 000 . 0'O- n c m en v- C
* -
00
0) ~ 0).~ 00)
4 '
0'C- C
[Vol. 29:
- .. a.
Winter 2002] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2000 TERM 277
Cri
o Lo 0 Lo 0oo N~ )0AO O .
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
0 0 0 0 ~0 >~0
6.)
00
60 1- CD W 't- f CA~ M ( 0
4.o C4 C4.n
0c
(2 0 -N n 00 r- 0 m m' r)0
-' -' - M' C') eC m ~ i'
+ 6)
ON
r- 0 0
04t 0*6 - i0
m) m6)Ln W
*0 03
b 6)6))
[Vol. 29:
Winter 2002] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2000 TERM 279
o rl
*ntnt
04 V
U6 Q e)
00
-- 00
.2 2 N
0n m-c*5 0 l
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
r. F3W- 0kn 0 q~ a,* * - *
HO C4 -4
>
r-:c o cl O I
' ri o n6 a,
0 ' e
r'I r N 0 rI rJ
r~o~'66o~6
Ho
eI ti. C..)
O 00000 0 000 0
-H-
00 - - -. -q :
o, 6 oc,6 D .,
00 CUT'T'R n 'TI
N N N N
'0 '0 50 50
o o 0 0
o 0
o o 0 0
ri ~1- ri (N
o
'.0 m m "D0 6
o o 0 0
o oo
~o. 0202
00 0 0
ri ~
0.0.02
0 0 0
0 0
o ~ 0
6~6(N
0 N0
.d .
o
[Vol. 29:
EU
0
Winter 2002] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2000 TERM
o Lo 0o I"N UO
0
jg)
.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
-I-'
00 o 0000o
Cu
"D 00000000
0 0 0 00 00
0
[Vol. 29:
Winter 20021 SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2000 TERM 283
0 ~~4~~4 44
. . . .4 ~ kn 4t'
........ *d****4* 4
..........0~~
u
c 4 . r
kn ~ ~
.2
b C4 In nm o
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
lr "-: 0 r r! c c ', t C,
M c - 00 kn 0 N V) c0 00 00 0 N N N
0 C-4
> C r el c IcN c, m c W) m m c:> w
cd qT 00 It 't m I?
.9
<= 0 0 0 "N (4 C4 m m
rncnenen- =0 1- - c
SO00 0 6 N0 m m~ m N (0 0 m
(7 nt )W nk nV nt
oo It0 Na f "I V w) Uc 00
C> = INN n m m 0
r, r k
o0 0101w) 00 w _
o o o
SI~) V~
N N N
0 0 0 0 0 010 0 0
C.0 n 1, 6 T 0 n V
6) 6) z )kn r
;-.-m 0 6) 6)6
[Vol. 29:
0>
0
0l
" q c c
-,I- t
0o
Winter 20021 SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2000 TERM 285
0i
E
I
o u-i 0 Uf) 0o - LA '
A
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
0
C' 000
Q 
-q
C14 c 0 00 11 I
0 a <
Lo
fVol. 29:
[Vol 29:
Winter 2002] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2000 TERM 287
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 29:
S'if I M I -: ec " O
en I-- C)e No'.OW) M
> o i V-0--
r1
0 R)
C)F
'000O
F 1 r, '-
0 _5 . (C) ~) C) (C eN 0
00 00-- r- N -N e
ON0 0: 00 00 00 c 1 \.o 00 00 00 '0 0
m ) 0 '0 ::C q0 '0 'N- c -0N qr 0r
W , ' In) W ,) Cr q W ,C 00 ' ! -o ' Wf
'0 '0 '0 WtC 'C r- r- '-r e 00 eN
0) '0 C W C') C) '0 CW) l. r- fn CW) eN '0
0) N '0 C)0 r-- N- m 'C N N- Ir /)
N) C) r)
o or CCCr Cr,) CC
CC) en (Z) C) Cl ) -
en C- C14 M (-
mr rl eq m N
Cr C) 01
CC) CC)'
.4I' ' - 0')r m (' N N-
Cr) C)) wI) Cr) w) mC)'0
" r- N MC "C kn V
'0C/'C' m0 N '0 N
Q)C.
~1
*~C'~ CO
C.)00
'U .~
C,)
~
COC-0)
0)
0
• v• o
Winter 20021 SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2000 TERM
0 0r
Lj
o Lo 0 L 0o, r, u{' c'j
m
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
-
.
0 00 000 00 0
= =0 =0z=0=00=
0
r-0 q 40
M 10 0 _Iq I
0),
0) 00O )0 C
-0 - -l - -0 - - N4 I-
0
u
-00
b c O
[VoL 29:l 29:
rvnl. q:
Winter 2002] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2000 TERM 291
. . . . . . .N 0
Wi O.0
>C 1 0 _0
E ON
0) Z C)
-
rl ~ . 00 00
. . . . .0 6
0j ctC 00N
000r
- 00 0 .--: 0
~4
CU0 0 - 0 ' 0
a- ~ 0 0 -3 6 o
292 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 29:
Winter 20021 SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2000 TERM 293
o -
clJ
o U 0)
U))
°
(0
* C)
* C
U)
0)C
/ C
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
CC) >q, V = = = >~ I = 0
U 0
0))
CO 0
CO 0 C- ~ 0 C- C- C') - '
*0CZ ~ fO C~ N~
o - 0 C') -
00 ;0 , .en 0 m 0
m )0 c) 006 c
294
.~1
[VAl
C) r- 0n ) 00 V- .
In W) m I
0
0) 0)
o
0
0)
00CO
0)
00~
0
0 =
0)
U
0
o  29IVnl 0-
Winter 2002] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2000 TERM 295
0%
o .
en00 0n 0
tt3 O
o0OCD
00O0
>5 E
4I- (2 C20 co
I E
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
" qCli 00 en 1 I )0
(N ~ ~ O N
0  
"C ) I- ) If)0
C) -0 -
0 0' m
4-
Ct) I ~
~I'.6'.6
- I - -
II I
r- ~ ~ 00.0 In~ en 'ITI
2 U)00
o 0 C
>CW)
CN H 00 '.0 en0 en .0 ~ I"
2N - '0 0 '. '.0 Cq 00 fI'r
a, C 'n 0 CT o en 0 It i 0't O 0 G 00ON 6.) Nl 00 N- N 00 (N CCC - enC en0 CFH
E 0 N 10'0 0.-00 
m 
N ' . '0 0 CC (
a' 6) '.0 N W ) tn '.0 kn If ) .CJ If
0. 6)00 If) If) If) k It It W) Wf) IT~ W)
tn. W C f) WCC CCC 0n 00 0 C)C
0 f '0  0 C C C CC 0 - '0 c!0'. 6.) 0 '. If If ' - M InC I' Cm-tH)
a'..
-H
0 : * - CN 1-1 - -C'
r- N 0 - C 0 o l C) .
N- 00 W') MC U-0C~<.0 Cl 00l
00 -nfn C 00 (N ,1 -: 00
W') fn C 00 1-- . t /
Ox.
soj!=0u)0
CO >
u)U
2 CM9 4 l
[Vol. 29:
00
0
.t-
.0
C.)
Winter 2002] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2000 TERM 297
o~)
-
u-
u
o Lt 0 o 0
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
o 00000000 o
M M 0 4 C
> 0 00
to
cU 0-
C- ; C M,.
- .
r/ 9 > tq 
€q tq 
"
0 " , ' ' t
O "
*0
=5
[Vol. 29:
Winter 20021 SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2000 TERM
eq U
606
0
-0~ 0 0 6
C's
*0
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
IV. Analysis
Table 1: Civil Cases - State Government versus a Private Party.
Data Table 1 shows that the Court continued last Term's
conservative trend in "Majority" and "Split" decisions in this
category.39 However, there was no change in the voting pattern of the
Court's "Unanimous" decisions. The Court's scores this Term in
"Majority," "Split," and "Unanimous" decisions were 60.0%, 63.6%,
and 50.0% respectively.4'
The ordering of the Justices was similar to last Term's ordering,
with the exception of Justice Breyer. He made a significant move
from the third most conservative Justice last Term to this Term's most
liberal Justice.' Justice Breyer voted for the state 52.9% of the time
last Term but only voted for the state 35.7% of the time this Term.
Justice Stevens was the second most liberal Justice this Term,
marking the first time in five years that he was not ranked as the most
liberal Justice in this category. Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained
his position as the most conservative Justice the last four years by
voting in favor of the state 60.0% of the time. Justices Scalia and
Thomas, who also voted in favor of the state 60.0% of the time,
joined the Chief Justice at the top of the data table. 2
Mean Table 1 indicates that both Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Souter showed a statistically significant change in voting behavior. 3
Justice Rehnquist's score of 60.0% was slightly below his mean voting
percentage of 66.7% for all prior Terms in this category. Justice
Souter, on the other hand, was 8.65 percentage points higher than his
45.2% statistical mean score for all prior Terms. 4 For the 2000 Term,
39. Cases decided in favor of state government: Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606 (2001); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001); Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Shaw v. Murphy,
532 U.S. 223 (2001); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); City News
& Novelty, Inc. v. Waukesha,.531 U.S. 278 (2001); Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001).
Cases decided against the state government: Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606
(2001); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Becker v. Montgomery,
532 U.S. 757 (2001); Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000);
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
40. See infra Data Table 1.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See infra Mean Table 1.
44. See id.
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Justices Ginsburg and Stevens had a voting correlation of 0.97 and an
R2 score of 0.93." This means that, over time, the voting behavior of
these two Justices in Civil/State Party cases has moved in tandem.
The anticipated voting scores in this category were fairly accurate
this Term. The anticipated voting scores of Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy were the most accurate, with a very small error of -2.1 and
3.9 points respectively. The least accurate anticipated voting scores
were for Justice Souter (whose actual score was 16.4 percentage
points more conservative than anticipated) and for Justice Stevens
(whose actual score was 15.5 percentage points more conservative
than anticipated). For the 2001 term, we anticipate that Chief Justice
Rehnquist will again be the most conservative Justice and that Justice
Stevens will be the most liberal Justice in this category. 6
Data Table 2: Civil Cases - Federal Government versus a Private Party.
The Court's voting behavior on Data Table 2 is unclear this
Term."7 While the Court showed liberal movement in its "Majority"
and "Unanimous" decisions, it also showed conservative movement
in its "Split" decisions.48 Chart 2 shows that, for 2000, the voting
trends in "Split" and "Unanimous" cases converged on the trend line
charted by the "Majority" decisions.
The unusual movement this Term is also demonstrated by the
fact that six of the nine Justices (everyone except Justices Scalia,
Ginsburg, and Thomas) showed statistically significant changes in
their voting behavior.49 Two of these statistically significant voting
patterns (Justices Souter and Stevens) were more conservative than
last Term, and four of the statistically significant scores (Justices
45. See infra Regression Table 1.
46. See infra Data Table 1.
47. Cases decided in favor of the federal government: United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218 (2001); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53
(2001); NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001); United States v. Hatter,
532 U.S. 557 (2001); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483
(2001); United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200 (2001); Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). Cases decided against the federal government:
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc.,
532 U.S. 706 (2001); United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (2001); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532
U.S. 514 (2001); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001); Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Central Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425
(2001); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
531 U.S. 159 (2001).
48. See infra Data Table 2.
49. See infra Mean Table 2.
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Rehnquist, Breyer, Kennedy, and O'Connor) were more liberal than
last Term.
With regard to ranking, historically liberal Justice Stevens
recorded the most conservative score this Term, voting for the
Federal Government in 64.3% of the cases." Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who voted most conservatively last Term, moved to the second most
conservative position, voting for the Federal Government in 58.8% of
the cases. 2 Interestingly, Justices Ginsburg, Thomas, and Souter
comprised the middle bloc of Justices;53 Justices Ginsburg and Souter
normally vote very liberally in this category, and Justice Thomas is
considered to be a conservative judge (although he voted more
liberally on Data Table 2 last Term). 4 However, the Justices' voting
scores were so close to each other that a Justice's vote in one case
could have significantly altered the Justice's position on the table.
For example, if Justice Ginsburg had voted against the government in
one more case, she would have tied for the most liberal spot.
Generally, this category has been a reliable indicator of
conservative/liberal bias. However, factor analysis this Term dropped
Data Table 2 to the eighth most reliable indicator of ideological bias.5
This dramatic drop in reliability may be due to the unusual rank-
order voting patterns recorded this Term (with Justice Stevens as the
top "conservative"), the large number of statistically significant
departures from prior voting patterns, and the close bloc voting of
five members of the Court (Justices Ginsburg, Thomas, and Souter at
52.9, and Justices O'Connor and Breyer at 50.0).
Data Table 3: Criminal Cases - State Government versus a Private
Party.
Data Table 3 exhibits a decrease in the Court's support for the
states in criminal cases.5" Although the court voted for the state in
50. See infra Data Table 2.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See infra Part V.
56. Cases decided in favor of the state government: Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001);
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001); Arkansas v.
Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001); Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001); Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S.
17 (2001). Cases decided against the state government: Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S.
146 (2001); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001); Florida v. Thomas, 532 U.S. 774 (2001);
Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001); Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225 (2001); Artuz v.
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60% of the "Split" decisions, the Court voted for the state in only
42.9% of the "Unanimous" decisions and 50% of the "Majority"
decisions. More importantly, the Court voted more liberally (less
often for the state) in all three categories of decisions than it did last
Term. 7 Seven of the Justices voted considerably more liberally then
they have the past four Terms. The fact that all the Justices except
Justice Souter showed a statistically significant change in voting
behavior also indicates that the court may well be moving in a liberal
direction." Unexpected liberal voting patterns, especially by the
traditionally conservative Justices, suggest a possible reorientation of
the Court.
Despite the uniform liberal movement this Term, the
polarization of the Court on Data Table 3 remained very high. Over
41 points separated the most "liberal" and "conservative" Justices.
However, the polarization this Term was not quite as high as it has
been the last few years."
The ordering of the Justices was consistent with the classic
ideological organization of the Court. Justices Scalia and Thomas
recorded the highest score in this category, finding for the states
66.7% of the time. Not surprisingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist followed
Justices Scalia and Thomas, voting for the state 58.3% of the time.
The remaining six Justices voted in blocs of two. The traditional
"swing-voters," Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, voted for the state
50% of the time. Justices Souter and Stevens voted for the state
33.3% of the time, with Justices Breyer and Ginsburg voting for the
state only 25% of the time.'
In light of the unusual liberal movement this Term, the
anticipated scores for both the Court and the individual Justices were
too conservative. Only the anticipated voting scores for Justices
Stevens and Souter, the only Justices to vote more conservatively
than last Term, were too liberal. The 2000 Term marked the most
liberal voting scores Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Ginsburg
have recorded on this Data Table since they were appointed to the
Court.6
Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000).
57. See infra Data Table 3.
58. See infra Mean Table 3.
59. See infra Data Table 3.
60. See id.
61. See id.
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Data Table 4: Criminal Cases - Federal Government versus a Private
Party.
The Court has decreased its support of the federal government in
criminal cases over the last four years.62 Data Table 4 shows the
Court's continuation of this liberal trend. Since this Study began, the
Court has never shown less support for the federal government than
it did this Term.63 This Term's voting score was 28.6% in "Majority"
decisions and 20.0% in "Split" decisions. This is a significant drop of
25.9 points and 37.1 points, respectively, compared to last Term. The
Court's score remained the same as last Term's score in "Unanimous"
decisions, but with only one unanimous decision made by the Court
this Term, no real comparisons can be drawn.'
This pronounced liberal movement seems noteworthy. All of the
Justices showed a statistically significant change in voting behavior.65
And, with the exception of Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, and Thomas,
whose scores were 1.4, 20.3, and 32.4 points more conservative than
expected, the rest of the Court voted more liberally than anticipated.
Last Term we posited that one possible reason for the court's liberal
movement over the last four Terms could be the Court's "strict"
reading of criminal statutes, which leads to liberal outcomes.66 Close
adherence to statutory text, generally speaking, is a conservative
judicial stance. Thus, the liberal movement in Data Table 4 could be
explained as the result of ideologically conservative Justices reading
statutory text narrowly, thereby favoring the criminal defendants.
However, last year's explanation for the Court's support of private
parties seems suspect this Term, as the traditionally conservative
Justices voted against private parties more than half of the time.
Justices Scalia and Thomas voted against private parties 85.7% of the
time, and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor voted
against private parties 57.1% of the time.67 The data this Term
suggests that the Court might have indeed demonstrated a slight
liberal reorientation in federal criminal cases.
62. Cases decided in favor of the federal government: Buford v. United States, 532
U.S. 59 (2001); Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230 (2001). Cases decided against the federal
government: Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S.
348 (2001); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198
(2001).
63. See infra Data Table 4.
64. See id.
65. See infra Mean Table 4.
66. See 1999 Study supra note 1, at 554.
67. See infra Data Table 4.
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Justices Souter and Stevens voted for the government in criminal
cases only 16.7% and 14.3% of the time, while Justices Kennedy,
Breyer, and Ginsburg voted for the federal government 28.6% of the
time.68 Justice Kennedy voted significantly more liberally than he did
last Term, marking the most liberal score ever for Justice Kennedy in
this category. Overall, the Court remains polarized in federal
criminal cases, with a bare majority of the Court (Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, Souter, Stevens and Kennedy) favoring private parties over
the federal government in criminal cases.
As with last Term, the strongest correlation in voting behavior
was between Justices Souter and Ginsburg. They had a voting
correlation of 0.97 and an R'score of 0.94.69 For the 2001 Term, the
Study anticipates that the Court will continue its liberal trend.7 °
Data Table 5: First Amendment Rights of Expression, Association, and
Religion.
Data Table 5 demonstrates liberal movement and increased
support of First Amendment claims by the Court this Term." The
score for "Majority" cases increased by 30.6 points, and the score for
"Split" cases increased by 50 points. Like last Term, there were no
"Unanimous" cases in favor of First Amendment claims.73
Only four of the Justices voted within 10 points of their
anticipated scores; the other five Justices' scores deviated from their
anticipated scores by 26.8 to 70.2 points.74 The large error between
the anticipated and actual scores of the individual Justices
demonstrates volatility in this category and could be due to the small
number of First Amendment cases heard by the Court this Term.
However, it is notable that even though more than half of the
Justices' voting scores deviated significantly from their anticipated
scores, the error between the Court's overall anticipated and actual
voting scores for "Majority" cases was only 10.8 points.75 Thus, while
68. See id.
69. See infra Regression Table 4.
70. See infra Data Table 4.
71. Cases decided in favor of the First Amendment claim: Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Legal
Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). Cases decided against the First
Amendment claim: Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001).
72. See infra Data Table 5.
73. See id.
74. See infra Data Table 5.
75. See id.
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individual Justices demonstrated somewhat unusual voting patterns,
the Court (as a whole) remained within anticipated limits.
Of the three Justices who demonstrated a statistically significant
change in voting behavior this Term, Justices Scalia and Thomas
voted more conservatively than expected by 50.6 and 52.5 points,
respectively, while Justice Breyer voted more liberally by 70.2
points. 6
Justice Kennedy continued to show high receptivity to First
Amendment claims this Term, although his scores were not as high as
they have been in past years. Justice Kennedy held in favor of First
Amendment claims in 75% of the cases this Term, tying Justice
Breyer for the most liberal ranking.77 In 1999, Justice Kennedy also
held the most liberal ranking with a score of 77.8, and in 1998, he tied
with five other Justices for the most liberal position with a score of
100." Justice Kennedy's voting score was the most predictable this
Term; his actual score deviated from his anticipated score by only 2.3
points.79 These statistics suggest that Justice Kennedy may be the
most consistently receptive member of the Court to First Amendment
claims.
Two of the most conservative Justices, Justices Scalia and
Thomas, showed the highest level of correlation with a score of 0.97
and an R'score of 0.94.' Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, two of the
most liberal Justices, also showed a very high level of correlation with
a score of 0.97 and an R2 score of 0.92.81 The First Amendment voting
patterns of these two pairs of Justices, therefore, move together over
time.
Data Table 6: Equal Protection Claims.
The Court decided four Equal Protection cases this Term,'
which is as many as it decided during the last three Terms combined -
one in 1999, one in 1998, and two in 1997. The small number of cases
in this category makes it difficult to identify trends and to anticipate
76. See id; infra Mean Table 5.
77. See infra Data Table 5.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See infra Regression Table 5.
81. See id.
82. Cases decided in favor of the Equal Protection claim: Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000). Cases decided against the Equal Protection claim: Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53
(2001); Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356 (2001).
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voting behavior. Although it cannot conclusively be called a trend,
the data shows slight conservative movement on Data Table 6. In
past years, we have analyzed the limited data in conjunction with
prior Terms' results in hope that a comparative analysis would
provide a better indicator of ideological trends in this category of
decisions. 3 The results of these comparisons have shown that the
majority tends to support Equal Protection claims 50% of the time.
Interestingly, with increased data this Term, eight of the nine
Justices voted for the Equal Protection claim 50% of the time.' Only
Justice Stevens, oddly the most "conservative" Justice on Data Table
6 this Term, voted for the claim only 25% of the time."5 Overall, the
Court seems to be maintaining its historically conservative disposition
in Equal Protection cases.
Most likely because of the small universe of cases, the Justices'
actual scores deviated significantly from anticipated voting scores.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsburg, Justice
Breyer, and Justice Souter voted over forty points more liberally than
anticipated. Justice O'Connor was the most predictable Justice in this
category with a difference of only 2.7% from her anticipated score. 6
Only Justices Scalia and Stevens showed a statistically significant
change in voting behavior this Term.'
There was an extremely high correlation of 1.00 and an
extremely high R2 score of 1.00 between the historically liberal
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter. 8 Justice Thomas and Justice
Scalia also recorded a high correlation of 0.97 and a high R2 score of
0.93.89 However, the high number of correlated pairs may be due to
the small number of cases in this category.
Data Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights Claims.
Table 7 shows slight liberal movement compared to the previous
Term. However, since the Court decided only three cases in this
category, it is difficult to make any definitive conclusions about the
Court's voting behavior.' The data, furthermore, seems to indicate
83. See 1998 Study supra note 1, at 483-84; 1999 Study supra note 1, at 549.
84. See infra Data Table 6.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See infra Mean Table 6.
88. See infra Regression Table 6.
89. See id.
90. Cases decided in favor of the Statutory Civil Rights claim: PGA Tour, Inc. v.
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conservative movement over time in this category despite the liberal
movement this Term.9'
While there were only three cases in this category this Term, the
voting behavior of the Justices was sharply divided between the
liberal and conservative Justices. The conservative movement of the
two most conservative Justices and the liberal movement of the
liberal bloc of Justices demonstrate the Court's increased polarization
on statutory civil rights claims. Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg,
and Souter all voted in favor of the claim 100% of the time, while
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Rehnquist voted in favor of the
claim only 33.3% of time. Justices Scalia and Thomas never voted in
favor of the claim. These voting blocs reflect the profound
conservative/liberal split of the current Court.
There is a great deal of volatility in the Court in this category of
cases. Mean Table 7 indicates that all of the Justices except Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy showed a statistically
significant change in voting behavior.93 This change in voting
behavior is also reflected in the large error between the actual and
anticipated voting scores of the Justices. With the exception of Chief
Justice Rehnquist, who voted 33.3 points more liberally than
anticipated, the historically conservative Justices voted more
conservatively than anticipated, and the historically liberal Justices
voted more liberally than anticipated. Specifically, Justice Ginsburg
voted 80.4 points more liberally than anticipated, Justice Souter voted
48.3 points more liberally than anticipated, and Justice Stevens voted
42.0 points more liberally than anticipated. Justice O'Connor, on the
other hand, voted 45.2 points more conservatively than anticipated,
Justice Scalia voted 38.9 points more conservatively, and Justice
Thomas voted 40.5 points more conservatively than anticipated.94
Justices Stevens' and Breyer's voting patterns tend to move
similarly over time on statutory civil rights claims, with a correlation
of 0.97 and an R2 score of 0.92." Justices Souter and Ginsburg
demonstrate a weaker, but possibly significant relationship. The data
Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001). Cases decided against the Statutory Civil Rights claim:
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human Resources, 532
U.S. 598 (2001); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
91. See infra Data Table 7.
92. See id.
93. See infra Mean Table 7.
94. See infra Data Table 7.
95. See infra Regression Table 7.
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this Term shows that their voting patterns have a correlation of 0.95
and an R2score of 0.90.
Data Table 8: Federal Jurisdiction Claims.
After showing significant liberal movement and increased
support of federal jurisdiction last Term, the Court showed
conservative movement in its "Majority," "Split," and "Unanimous"
decisions,' and each Justice's individual scores were more
conservative than they were last Term.'
Last Term, all of the Justices except Justice Breyer showed a
statistically significant change in voting behavior.98 However, none of
the Justices showed a statistically significant change in voting
behavior this Term." The error between the overall anticipated and
actual voting scores of the Court's "Majority" cases was also fairly
low at 9.1 points.1" Thus, it appears that the Court is likely returning
to more normal voting patterns after last Term's significant liberal
movement and anomalous support of federal jurisdiction. However,
despite the Court's conservative movement, this Term's scores were
still more liberal than seven of the past nine "Majority" decisions, six
of the past nine "Split" decisions, and three of the past nine
"Unanimous" decisions.10
1
Justice Stevens was the most liberal Justice for the third year in a
row. Justice O'Connor, who tied for the second most liberal score
last Term, voted most conservatively this Term."° Justice Ginsburg
96. Cases in favor of the exercise of federal jurisdiction: Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678 (2001); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353
(2001); Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348 (2001); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001);
Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757 (2001); United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (2001);
C & L Enter., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411 (2001);
Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17 (2001); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001);
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); E. Associated Coal Corp. v.
United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57 (2000); Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000).
Cases decided against the exercise of federal jurisdiction: Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656
(2001); Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348 (2001); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001);
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001); New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001); Major
League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001); Lewis v. Lewis & Clark
Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438 (2001); City News & Novelty, Inc. v. Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278
(2001).
97. See infra Data Table 8.
98. See 1999 Study supra note 1, at 584, Mean Table 8.
99. See infra Mean Table 8.
100. See infra Data Table 8.
101. See id.
102. See id.
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shared the highest correlation score of 0.98 and highest R2 score of
0.95 with Justice Souter and the second highest correlation score of
0.95 and an R2score of 0.90 with Justice Kennedy.3
Last Term, Jurisdiction cases were the least reliable indicator of
ideology in the Court's voting trends. This Term, Jurisdiction moved
up two positions to the seventh most reliable indicator, in part
because the Civil/Federal Party and Criminal/State Party categories
dropped significantly in their levels of reliability as indicators of the
Court's conservative/liberal bias under factor analysis."°
Data Table 9: Federalism Cases.
Data Table 9 shows a slight liberal trend in the Court's treatment
of federalism issues." For the first time in three Terms, the Court
voted more liberally in "Majority" and "Split" decisions than it had in
the prior Term, thus slowing the conservative trend of recent years.
Although the Court showed a conservative increase of 15% in
"Unanimous" decisions over last Term, more Justices voted against
the state in all categories of cases with federalism issues this Term."
Thus, considered as a whole, Data Table 9 suggests slight liberal
movement.
Justices Scalia and Thomas recorded the most conservative score
on Data Table 9 by voting in favor of states' rights in 57.1% of the
federalism cases. Justice Ginsburg recorded the most liberal score in
this category, voting for the state only 28.6% of the time. There is no
significant change in the historical conservative/liberal ranking of the
Court in this category.
Although four of the nine Justices showed a statistically
significant change in voting behavior this Term,' °7 this category
showed the least amount of overall error between the Court's
103. See infra Regression Table 8.
104. See infra Part V.
105. Cases decided in favor of the state government: Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532
U.S. 318 (2001); Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Semtek Int'l Inc., v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497
(2001); Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438 (2001); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). Cases decided in favor of the federal government:
Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001); Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001);
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001); Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001);
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000); Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000); City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
106. See infra Data Table 9.
107. See infra Mean Table 9.
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anticipated and actual scores of "Majority" cases. The 40.5%
anticipated score was only 2.4% more liberal than the actual score of
42.9%. The anticipated score for Justice Kennedy was only 0.3%
more liberal than his actual score of 42.9%.3 There was no real
significant correlation between the voting behavior of any of the
Justices in this category.
Data Table 10: Swing Vote Cases.
Data Table 10 contains the voting scores from cases that were
decided by a margin of one vote this Term."' Because of the narrow
voting margin, Swing-vote cases may well be the most reliable
indicator of the Court's position on the conservative/liberal spectrum.
(We use factor analysis to gauge the relative value of the other nine
tables in assessing ideology. See supra Part V.) This Term, the Court
reached a conservative result in 60.0% of Swing-vote cases.11 This
result is nearly identical to last year's 61.5% score and continues last
Term's trend of reaching conservative outcomes in cases decided by
one vote."'
This Term, Justice Kennedy was the Justice who voted most
often with the majority in cases decided by one vote, voting with the
majority 83.33% of time."' His return to the top of the Table moved
him back to the position that he held during the 1992-1997 Terms.'
1 3
At the other end of the spectrum, the most recent nominees to the
Court, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, tied as the Justices most likely
not to vote with the majority, voting only 36.67% of the time with the
108. See infra Data Table 9.
109. Swing-vote cases reaching a conservative outcome: Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656
(2001); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va.
Dep't. of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001); City of Atwater v. Lago Vista,
532 U.S. 318 (2001); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Hunt v. Cromartie, 532
U.S. 234 (2001); Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
532 U.S. 105 (2001); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). Swing-
vote cases reaching a liberal outcome: Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); Calcano-
Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348 (2001); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Idaho v. United
States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001); NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001);
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98 (2000).
110. See infra Data Table 10.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
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majority in Swing-vote cases.14
The anticipated voting scores for the Justices were fairly accurate
this Term."5 Six of the Justices' actual scores (Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor, Thomas, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg) were within 15
percentage points of their anticipated voting scores. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia voted more often with the majority than
anticipated by 19.8% and 16.3% respectively. "6  Only Justice
Kennedy showed a statistically significant change in voting behavior
this Term."t 7 Anticipated voting scores for the 2001 Term show that
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, again, will be the most likely
Justices to vote with the majority in cases decided by one vote and
that Justices Souter and Breyer will be the least likely to vote with the
majority in such cases. '
The regression table demonstrates an interesting negative
correlation this Term. With a negative correlation score of -0.97 and
an R2 score of 0.94, there is a high negative correlation in voting
behavior between Justices Breyer and Scalia."9 These scores suggest
that, over time, these two Justices tend to be on opposite sides of
closely divided cases.
During the 1999 Term, the conservative Justices voted more
often with the majority while the liberal Justices voted less often with
the majority than they did during the 1998 Term. However, this Term,
with the exception of Justice Kennedy, the conservative Justices
voted less often with the majority, and the liberal Justices voted more
often with the majority than they did in the 1999 Term.' 2' Thus,
although the Court voted conservatively in roughly the same
percentage of cases as it did last Term, there appears to be increased
tension in the Court with regard to who is voting with the majority
when cases are decided by one vote.
114. See id.
115. See infra Data Table 10.
116. See id.
117. See infra Mean Table 10.
118. See infra Data Table 10.
119. See infra Regression Table 10.
120. See infra Data Table 10.
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V. Category Analysis
Beginning in the 1996 Term, we began to analyze the
effectiveness of this Study's categories in measuring liberal and
conservative tendencies and trends. As might be expected, certain
categories are better indicators than others of the Court's collective
and individual predilections.
Some categories, although tending to divide the Court into
conservative/liberal blocs, may "change polarity" depending on the
specific issues presented. For example, during the 1996 Term, our
First Amendment tally placed Justices Scalia and Thomas at the top -
a liberal position under this Study's definitions, and a position not
commonly occupied by these particular Justices. Conversely, Justice
Breyer held the bottom spot during that Term. These unusual results
seemed to result from other ideological issues implicated in the
decisions.121 We have also encountered other problems over the
years. For example, a small sample within a given category results in
highly volatile score movements from Term to Term because a single
case may account for many percentage points. This point was
dramatically illustrated in the 1999 Term in the Equal Protection
category, with only one case touching on the issue.122 Because only
one Equal Protection issue was decided (and was decided
unanimously for the claim), each Justice scored 100% in that category
- an unprecedented result.123
In order to determine which categories best differentiate
between the more conservative and more liberal Justices, we apply
factor analysis.24 By applying this method, we have determined that a
primary factor may be extracted from the Study's categories that
accounts for over 25% of the variance revealed by the data on Tables
1 through 9.125 We interpret this factor as conservative/liberal bias
because that is what this Study purports to measure. The categories
load onto this primary factor this Term as follows:
121. See 1996 Study supra note 1, at 90-92.
122. See 1999 Study supra note 1, at 574, Data Table 6.
123. See id.
124. See infra Appendix B for more information regarding factor analysis.
125. We applied a QMAX rotation to achieve this result. See infra note 136 for more
information on QMAX rotation
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Category Factor 1
Criminal/State Party 0.848
Civil/State Party 0.852
Criminal/Federal Party 0.690
Federalism 0.623
Equal Protection 0.372
First Amendment 0.206
Jurisdiction 0.205
Civil/Federal Party 0.159
Statutory Civil Rights 0.045
Variance 2.5584
% Variance 0.284
According to this ranking, the Civil/State Party category appears
to be our best indicator of conservative/liberal leanings, while the
Statutory Civil Rights category is our poorest indicator this Term.
Over the years, cases with statutory civil rights claims have been rare
and have produced volatile results. Although Equal Protection cases
moved up three spots to the fifth best indicator this year, cases in this
category have also become increasingly rare (only four cases this
Term and only one last Term). 6 First Amendment cases were also
rare this Term and have produced volatile results over the years.'27
First Amendment cases also tend toward pole swapping. For
example, if the 1996 Term's free speech issues had concerned flag
burning rather than abortion clinic demonstrations and gay rights, the
scores might have been nearly reversed.2"
Although Civil/Federal Party cases have become steadily better
indicators of the Court's ideology over the course of this Study, this
category of cases dropped to second to the last this year. Cases in this
category tend to switch poles as executive administrations change.
Liberal administrations will bring different types of cases before the
Court than will conservative administrations and will garner the
support of different Justices. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist's
average score was 74% under Republican administrations, but fell to
61% after President Clinton took office. On the other hand, Justice
Stevens averaged 48% under the Republicans and 59% under
President Clinton.'2" This category will be interesting to follow under
126. See supra Data Table 6.
127. See supra Data Table 5.
128. 1996 Study supra note 1, at 91.
129. See supra discussion of Data Table 2.
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the Bush Administration.
In summary, category analysis of the 2000 Term suggests that the
most reliable indicator of the Court's ideology is the data collected in
Table 1 (Civil/State Party), with Tables 3 (Criminal/State Party), 4
(Criminal/Federal Party), and 9 (Federalism) providing the next most
reliable data. Tables 6 (Equal Protection), 5 (First Amendment), 8
(Jurisdiction), 2 (Civil/Federal Party), and 7 (Statutory Civil Rights)
provide the least reliable information.
VI. Frontier Analysis
Attempting to quantify the magnitude of a Justice's liberal or
conservative tendencies and identifying trends in such tendencies
over time is challenging for a variety of reasons. One challenge
already discussed is that of choosing appropriate tests and assessing
their validity. Another is dealing with inconsistency in the nature of
cases appealed to the Court from one Term to the next and the
Court's selection of which issues it will decide. Given these varying
parameters, is there any meaningful way to quantify, analyze, and
compare the Justices' inclinations? One potentially useful method is
frontier analysis.3°
Frontier analysis focuses on the Justices' relative scores rather
than on their absolute scores. Boundaries or "frontiers" are defined
by the highest and lowest scores in each category and each
combination of categories. Each Justice is then evaluated relative to
the established frontier. Moreover, by adjusting the relative weights
allocated to each category, the frontier can be adjusted to reflect each
category's effectiveness as determined by factor analysis.
We present liberal and conservative frontier data for the Court
in Frontier Analysis Tables 1-4 below. Two versions of each frontier
are presented. In Tables 1 and 2, we constrain the weights applied to
each category according to the factor analysis hierarchy described in
Part V of this article. In other words, each Justice is allowed to
"choose" the weights that produce the highest frontier score for him
or her, subject to the limitation that no category can receive more
weight than a more reliable category (e.g. Criminal/State Party - this
Term's most reliable factor - cannot receive more weight than
Civil/State Party - this Term's most reliable factor). Tables 3 and 4
apply no weighting constraints at all, allowing each Justice to
"choose" those weights that present him or her in the most
130. See infra Appendix B for more information regarding frontier analysis.
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conservative or liberal light possible without regard to the factor
analysis hierarchy. Each table lists a "Percent of Frontier " score for
each Justice. Those with a score of 100% reach the frontier by
employing the category weight distribution shown in the category
columns. Scores that are less than 100% indicate that the most
conservative or liberal score the Justice could obtain with optimal
weighting places him or her the indicated percentage of the way
toward the frontier. In some cases, an optimal combination of
weights may place a Justice beyond the frontier. This condition is
known as "superefficiency" and is noted in the charts when present.
Frontier Analysis Charts 1 and 2 show the constrained scores of
each Justice over the course of this Study in graphical form. Near the
bottom of each chart is an indication of new Justices replacing
outgoing Justices on the Court. Although former Justices' scores are
not indicated, they contributed to frontier determination during
Terms in which they sat on the Court.
Frontier Charts 3 and 4 show each Justice's range of frontier
scores during the course of this Study. They are easier to read than
the line graphs and give a clearer picture of the Justice's relative
positions and score ranges over time. They do not, however, show
any trend information (that is, the charts do not demonstrate
whether, during the past several Terms, each Justice has been voting
closer to or farther away from a respective frontier).
Frontier Tables 3 and 4, where the "frontier" is established
without weighting the reliability of the nine categories of this Study,
provide some interesting results. Perhaps most surprisingly, Justice
Stevens tops both tables as both the most "conservative" and
"liberal" Justice on both frontiers - even scoring a superefficient
score of 150% on the unconstrained conservative frontier. Somewhat
less surprising are the Justices who follow Justice Stevens on Table 3:
Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Thomas (each reaching at
least 100% of the unconstrained conservative frontier, with Justices
Scalia and Rehnquist scoring modestly superefficient scores).
Table 3 also shows that Justice Kennedy - the often-crucial fifth
vote on the Court - is near the bottom of the unconstrained
conservative frontier table. He is also precisely in the middle of
Table 4, which plots the unconstrained liberal frontier. These voting
patterns are consistent with Justice Kennedy's role this Term as the
predominant "swing-voter": he is on the liberal fringe of the
unconstrained conservative frontier and right behind the dominant
actors on the unconstrained liberal frontier. In this position, he is
poised to provide the crucial fifth vote when either a conservative or a
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liberal four-member bloc of the Court appears.
Tables 1 and 2, which constrain the frontiers according to the
outcome of our factor analysis, demonstrate voting patterns that are
quite consistent with commonly held, non-quantitative (that is, non-
statistical and non-mathematical) views of the Justices' and the
Court's ideology. Justice Scalia, with a superefficient score of 101%,
marks the outer boundary of the constrained conservative frontier
plotted on Table 1 and lands at the bottom of the constrained liberal
frontier set by Table 2. Conversely, Justice Breyer sets the outer
perimeter of the constrained liberal frontier on Table 2 and holds the
last place on the constrained conservative frontier contained on Table
1. The next two most conservative points on the constrained
conservative frontier of Table 1 are held by Justices Thomas and
Rehnquist - who also hold corresponding positions at the bottom of
the constrained liberal frontier of Table 2. Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor hold the fourth and fifth most conservative slots on Table 1
and essentially identical positions at the bottom of Table 2 (although
Justice O'Connor, rather than Justice Kennedy, holds the more
conservative position on Table 2). Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter,
and Stevens hold the most liberal positions at the bottom of Table 1
and corresponding positions (in a slightly different order) at the top
of the constrained liberal frontier of Table 2.
Frontier Charts 1 and 2 demonstrate, in graphic form, the results
summarized above. Charts 3 and 4 demonstrate the range of scores
that each Justice has plotted on the constrained conservative and
liberal frontiers during the course of this Study by showing the "top"
and "bottom" conservative and liberal scores of each Justice. The
width of the various lines plotted between these two points represent,
in graphic form, the number of times each Justice has scored within
that range - the "thicker" the line between the top and bottom scores,
the more times a score at that point on the frontier has been plotted.
Chart 3 shows that Justices Rehnquist and Thomas have set the
outer (and superefficient) boundaries of the constrained conservative
frontier. The other three Justices that make up the "conservative"
swing bloc on the Court, Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Scalia,
have all - at one time or another - reached 100% of the constrained
conservative frontier. Only Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and
Souter have never reached the frontier. Over time, Justice Stevens,
for his part, has stayed in the range farthest from the constrained
conservative frontier.
Chart 4 demonstrates that Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Souter
dominate the outer reaches of the constrained liberal frontier. Justice
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Stevens, moreover, has consistently demonstrated superefficient
voting patterns on Chart 4. In addition to these three Justices with
superefficient scores, Justice Ginsburg has also reached the
constrained liberal frontier. By contrast, no member of the
''conservative five" has reached the constrained liberal frontier.
Chief Justice Rehnquist exhibits voting patterns, over time, farthest
from the 100% line of the frontier on Chart 4.
VII. Conclusion
The Court's voting behavior during the 2000 Term arguably
exhibits a modest liberal trend. The Court voted more liberally in six
of the ten categories of the Study this Term compared to last Term.
The strength of this liberal trend, however, is unknown. Factor
analysis suggests that Civil/State Party cases are the best indicator of
conservative/liberal bias, while Swing-vote data (not subjected to
factor analysis) also seems to provide a fairly reliable indication of the
Court's ideological stance. In both of these categories, the Court
showed conservative movement. Therefore, it is difficult to state with
any assurance that the Court is moving in any sustained way along
either a liberal or a conservative axis.
It does seem clear, however, that the current Court is voting in
identifiable blocs. The Civil/State Party scores, our most reliable
statistical evidence of conservative/liberal bias, are indicative of this
fact. Data Table 1 reflects identifiable voting groups within the Court
- with Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas posting identical scores
and Justices Kennedy and O'Connor falling in behind them (also with
identical scores). Although the picture from Data Table 1 is less than
conclusive, since Justice Souter (a frequent visitor to the liberal
frontier) finds himself wedged between the most conservative three
and Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, even clearer evidence of
conservative/liberal blocs is shown on Data Tables 3, 4, and 10.
Moreover, Data Table 10, the Swing-vote data, demonstrates that -
while the Court this Term continued a conservative trend that began
last Term - the liberal bloc of the Court is nevertheless gaining
ground in these closely divided cases.
All of this gives substantial quantitative evidence that the present
Court stands in an uneasy ideological balance. It is impossible to
know with certainty from the data whether the Court is more or less
conservative (or liberal) in 2000 than it was in 1999. What is obvious
is that the balance of power within the Court is fragile. As a result,
the replacement of any of the three most conservative members of the
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Court (the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas) or the two
"swing-votes" (Justices Kennedy and O'Connor) could well result in
an avulsive change in the ideological stance of the Court.
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APPENDIX A
1. The Universe of Cases
The only cases included in the database are those 2000 Term
cases decided by full opinion. Decisions on motions have been
excluded even if accompanied by an opinion. Cases handled by
summary disposition are included only if they are accompanied by a
full opinion of the Court, but not if the only opinion is a dissent.
Cases decided by a four-four vote resulting in affirmance without
written opinion have been excluded. Both signed and unsigned per
curium opinions are considered full opinions if they set forth reasons
in a more than perfunctory manner. Cases that do not fit within any
of the nine categories are not included in the database for any of the
tables.
2. Cases Classified as Civil or Criminal
The classification of cases as civil or criminal follows commonly
understood definitions. '31 Generally, the nature of the case is clearly
identified in the opinion. Only occasionally does a case pose a
problem of classification. No cases in the 2000 Term raised such a
question.
3. Cases Classified by Nature of the Parties - Data Tables 1 through 4
Cases are included on Data Tables 1 through 4 only if
governmental and private entities appear as opposing parties. This is
necessarily true of criminal cases. Civil cases are excluded from these
tables if they do not satisfy this criterion. The governmental entity
might be the United States government or one of its agencies or
officials, or with respect to a state government, one of its political
subdivisions. A suit against a government official in a personal
capacity is included in this category if government attorneys represent
the official or if the interests of the government are otherwise clearly
implicated. In instances of multiple parties, a civil case is excluded if
governmental entities appear on both sides of the controversy. If
both a state and a federal entity are parties to the same suit on the
same side with only private parties on the other, the case is included
on both Data Tables 1 and 2. A case is included more than once on
131. Although habeas corpus actions are civil in nature, we classify them as criminal
because they inevitably involve review of criminal actions.
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the same table if it raises two or more distinct issues affecting the
outcome of the case and the issues are resolved by different voting
alignments.
4. Classification by Nature of the Issue - Data Tables 5 through 9
A case is included in each category of Data Tables 5 through 9
for which it raises a relevant issue that is addressed by written
opinion. Thus, one case may be included on two or more tables. A
case is also included more than once on the same table if it raises two
or more distinct issues in the category affecting the disposition of the
case and the issues are resolved by different voting alignments. A
case is not included on a table if an issue raised by one of the litigants
is not addressed in any opinion.
Identification of First Amendment and Equal Protection issues
poses no special problem since the nature of each claim is expressly
identified in the opinion. Issues of freedom of speech, press,
association, and free exercise of religion are included. However,
Establishment Clause cases are excluded since one party's claim of
religious establishment is often made against another party's claim of
free exercise or some other individual right, thus blurring the issue of
individual rights."2
Statutory civil rights included on Data Table 7 are limited to
those invoking the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of
1965, and other civil rights statutes expressly barring discrimination
on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, or
physical handicap. Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are
included if the substantive right asserted is based on a federal statute
or if the issue involves the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the case
at hand. However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions are excluded if the
substantive right asserted is based on the United States Constitution
and the issue relates to that constitutional right. The purpose of this
exclusion is to preserve the distinction between constitutional and
non-constitutional claims.
For Data Table 8, jurisdictional questions are defined to include
not only federal jurisdiction33 per se, but also standing, mootness,
132. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001). Although
the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant violated both free speech rights and the
Establishment Clause, only the free speech issue was included in the First Amendment
category.
133. We only include a case in the Jurisdiction category if it raises an issue of federal
jurisdiction, as opposed to state court or Indian Tribal Court jurisdiction. For example,
even though the Court decided an issue of Tribal Court jurisdiction in Nevada v. Hicks,
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ripeness, abstention, equitable discretion, and justiciability.
Jurisdictional questions are excluded if neither party challenges
jurisdiction and no member of the Court dissents on the question,
even though the Court may comment on its jurisdiction."'
Federalism cases on Data Table 9 are limited to those cases in
which there are issues raised by conflicting actions of federal and
state or local governments. Common examples of these issues are
preemption, intergovernmental immunities, application of the Tenth
and Eleventh Amendments as a limit on federal government action,
and federal court interference with state court activities (other than
review of state court decisions). Issues of "horizontal" federalism or
interstate relationships, such as those raised by the dormant
Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause, are
excluded from the table.
5. Swing Vote Cases
Data Table 10 includes all cases where the outcome turns on a
single vote. This category includes five-four decisions and four-three
decisions, if any, as well as five-three and four-two decisions that
reverse a lower court decision. Affirmances by a vote of five-three or
four-two are not included because a shift of one vote from the
majority to the minority position would still result in affirmance by a
tie vote. A case is included more than once in Table 10 if it raises two
or more distinct issues affecting the disposition of the case and the
issues are resolved by different voting alignments.
533 U.S. 353 (2001), we did not include the case in the Jurisdiction category because no
issue of federal jurisdiction was present.
134. See, e.g., Florida v. Thomas, 532 U.S. 774 (2001). Although the case was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, we did not include it in the Jurisdiction category because
neither of the parties raised the issue of jurisdiction and the Court decided the issue
unanimously.
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APPENDIX B
I. Study Methodology
This Study seeks to quantify three characteristics of Supreme
Court voting behavior: voting trends, mean voting percentages, and
relationships among the Justices' voting patterns. We analyze these
characteristics both for the Court as a whole and for individual
Justices."' The following sections explain the statistical methods
employed in this Study and how test results should be interpreted.
A. Scores
Each score in this Study is simply the percentage of times a
Justice voted in favor of the party or claim specified by the category.
Some categories contain fewer samples than others, resulting in
coarser score increments.
B. Anticipated Voting Behavior
Data in this project were fitted to an Auto Regressive Integrated
Moving Average (ARIMA) forecasting model.136 This model is useful
in circumstances where, as in this Study, a single variable (a Justice's
or the Court's score) is to be forecast based only on its present and
prior values with no other explanatory variables. ARIMA modeling
is most easily explained by starting in the middle of the acronym:
1. Integrated:
This refers to a differencing process, which operates in a manner
similar to differentiation of a continuous function in calculus. The
goal is simply to remove trend from the time series data by
subtracting each score in the time series from the next score in the
series. The resulting differences form a new time series. This
operation may be repeated successively until a trendless or
"stationary" series results. Our model employs only one differencing
operation.
135. Our ability to analyze newer Justices' voting patterns may be restricted or
precluded in some instances due to insufficient data.
136. ARIMA computer modeling was accomplished using MINITAB® statistical
software with p (the number of autoregressive terms) = 1, d (the number of non-seasonal
differences) = 1, and q (the number of lagged forecast errors in the prediction equation) =
1. For more information regarding the ARIMA (p,d,q) model, see PETER KENNEDY, A
GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 248-49 (1992).
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2. Auto-Regression:
Once the series has been made stationary, an autoregressive
parameter may be determined.137 This parameter seeks to relate each
data point in the stationary series to the data point immediately
preceding it through multiplication. That is:
X, = AX,1
where X, is the value of the data series at point t, A is the
autoregressive parameter, and X,1 is the value of the data series point
immediately preceding X,.
Because we are dealing with a series of data points, however, a
single parameter will almost never precisely produce the relationship
just described for all data point pairs. Some error is inevitable. We
therefore seek to determine that parameter which produces the least
total error when applied to the entire series.138
3. Moving Average:
A second parameter is determined that relates the value of each
series element X, to the error between the estimated value and the
actual value of the previous element X, 139 That is:
X, = -Bx,-,
where -B is the Moving Average parameter. The value of this
parameter is also optimized to minimize its total error when applied
to the series.
4. Synthesis:
The previous operations are combined into the equation:
X, = Ax,.,-Bx,.,+ E,
where E, represents the residual error remaining between the
calculated and actual values of X,. This final equation is used to
determine the anticipated voting score for the following Term.
137. Many statistical models employ more than one auto-regressive parameter due to
various properties of the data series. Our data series produces the most accurate forecasts
with single-parameter (first order) AR and MA models.
138. This is accomplished by applying a least squared estimation, i.e., the parameter is
chosen such that the sum of the squared errors is minimized.
139. Although this operation may not seem as intuitive as the auto-regression
operation, it may help to think of the error terms as "'shocks' that initially set the process
in motion and continue to keep it in motion thereafter." JOHN C. HOFF, A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO BOX-JENKINS FORECASTING 50 (1983).
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C. Mean Testing
We use a "student's t test"'4 ° to determine whether this Term's
score (X) departs in a statistically significant manner from the mean
of all previous Terms' scores (X). Essentially, we treat these two
numbers as the means of two independent samples drawn from the
universe of all scores in the category."' We hypothesize that X, is also
the true mean of the population ps, and we set up this hypothesis (the
"null" hypothesis) and its corresponding alternative hypothesis as
follows:
H: p = X1 The "null" hypothesis, i.e., X does not significantly
shift p from its previous value on the real number line. Therefore, the
two samples are statistically equivalent.
Hk: p X, The alternative hypothesis, i.e., X significantly shifts V
from its previous value on the real number line. Therefore, the two
samples are not statistically equivalent.
We then set out to prove the alternative hypothesis within a
certain confidence interval"2 by rejecting the null hypothesis.'43 This
is acqomplished by calculating the following statistic:
s / n
The result of this equation (t) is compared to the entry on a t-
distribution table corresponding to the confidence interval desired (.)
and the appropriate number of degrees of freedom (n-k).'" If the
absolute value of t is greater than the table entry, Ho is rejected and
we say that the Justice has shown a statistically significant change in
voting behavior this Term.
D. Correlation
Relationships between two Justices' voting records may be
140. For a practical perspective on this procedure, see DAVID S. MOORE & GEORGE
P. MCCABE, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACTICE OF STATISTICS 500-18 (1993). See also
CRAIG AND HOGG, supra note 38.
141. This approach introduces potential bias problems due to non-random sampling,
small samples, and dissimilar sample standard deviations. Nevertheless, we use the test to
impose some measure of discipline in analyzing the available data.
142. We have selected a confidence interval of 95%. Because this is a two-tailed test,
X2 may shift p in either a positive or negative direction, - = .025.
143. A full description of the logic behind this seemingly convoluted procedure is
beyond the scope of this article. However, its purpose is to control Type I (or alpha)
error. For a complete explanation, see MOORE AND MCCABE, supra note 140.
144. k = the number of parameters being tested; here, p is the only hypothesized
parameter, so k = 1.
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mapped over a two-dimensional Cartesian plane as in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1 shows a high degree of positive correlation (R2 = 0.7921)
between the voting percentages of the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia
for the Equal Protection category. The points all fall close to an
upward sloping line. On the other hand, Figure 2 shows that the
voting percentages of Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia show only a
very weak, negative correlation (R2 = 0.0473). The points are widely
scattered about a downward sloping line. Statistically significant
correlations between and among Justices' Term-to Term voting
patterns are shown in Regression Tables 1-10. The first number in
each pair is the Pearson correlation coefficient. The second number
is an R2 statistic.14 ' Notice that Justices for whom we have few data
points, such as Justice Breyer, are especially likely to show high
Pearson coefficients but low R2 statistics. The latter is a more reliable
measure of the actual level of correlation.
Equal Protection Cases y =0.717x +7.4944
F= 0.7921
80.
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Rehnquist
Figure 1
145. The R2 statistic is an estimate of ,2, the true measure of correlation between the
dependant variable and its independent counterpart(s). The "adjusted" R2 value in the
tables is a result of the computer's attempts to filter out any bias in the original R2 result.
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Equal Protection Cases
y =-0.1542x + 35.473
Ff =0.047380 i
.U 60--
cc 4U •
0 20 40 60 80 100
Stevens
Figure 2
The correlation measured is in the Term-to-Term movement of
Justices' scores. A high correlation between two Justices does not
mean that they necessarily vote together often. It simply means that
their scores tend to move up and down together from one Term to
another. Also note that correlation in no way implies causation.
E. Factor Analysis
Factor analysis has long been used by psychologists who attempt
to identify characteristics of personality or intelligence by using
batteries of tests. Their challenge has been to develop tests that
validly measure the characteristics of interest. This Study similarly
attempts to measure the Justices' liberal and conservative leanings by
"testing" their disposition of certain types of cases.
We performed a factor analysis of the Study categories using
Minitab software from Minitab, Inc. The factor loadings presented
were obtained by applying a QMAX rotation to the data. A full
description of the theory and mathematics underlying factor analysis
is beyond the scope of this appendix, but several books on the subject
provide reasonably simple explanations of this complex process.6
F. Frontier Analysis
Frontier analysis can probably best be described with an
146. See generally DENNIS CHILD, THE ESSENTIALS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS (2d ed.
1990); see also supra Part V.
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example. Suppose four individuals are competing for the title of
"world's greatest athlete." Their scores in two events are listed in the
following table:
Croquet Marbles
Alan 9 2
Betty 7 7
Chuck 4 5
Debbie 3 8
Alan's agent would argue that the title should go to the best
croquet player, while Debbie's agent would argue that the best
marbles player should win. Betty's agent would argue that each sport
should receive equal weight. To see why, weigh each of the scores
above by 50% and add each athlete's resulting scores together. Alan
would score (9 x 0.5) + (2 x 0.5) = 5.5. Betty would score (7 x 0.5) + (7
x 0.5) = 7. Chuck's score would be 4.5, and Debbie's score would be
5.5. The situation is presented graphically in the following figure:
A, B, C, and D represent the athletes. The solid line connecting
A, B, and D represents the athletic frontier, i.e., the boundary beyond
which no athlete has performed, regardless of the relative weights
assigned to marbles and croquet. A, B, and D are located at 100% of
the frontier. Moreover, B can be said to be super-efficient to the
extent it lies beyond the line AD connecting the two points adjacent
to it on the frontier. A and D are also super-efficient to the extent
they lie beyond lines (not shown) connecting B with the points at
Athletic Frontier
to4)
E 5
(U
0
Croquet
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which the frontier meets each axis. C falls short of the frontier
regardless of the weights assigned to marbles and croquet. However,
an optimal set of weights may be selected such that C "looks his
best," i.e., he comes closest to reaching the frontier.
The same concept can be applied to the Court to determine
which Justice is "most conservative" or "most liberal." However,
instead of two dimensions (croquet and marbles), the Court analysis
includes nine dimensions (all Study categories except Swing-votes).
Although human minds have difficulty envisioning nine dimensions,
computers can handle the required calculations with ease. We
performed our analysis using Microsoft Excel's solver feature.
Although the formulas and procedures involved are straightforward,
a complete description of them is beyond the scope of this
appendix.1 47
147. For more information on frontier analysis, see DONALD L. ADOLPHSON,
MANAGER'S TOOLKIT: MANAGERIAL SPREADSHEET ANALYSIS (1998).
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